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Mare_m76 ::Sirius ::Pumpe koje su ''sasekle'' peščane nasipe napravili su nemački inžinjeri. Arapi su im naručili pumpe za protivpožarna vozila i Nemci su prionuli na posao... Nisu ni znali za šta ih prave. Rendžerima je bio jedan od najvažnijih zadataka da brzovezujućim betonom zatvore šahte kroz koje su Izraelci planirali da puste naftu i zapale , stvarajući tako neprelaznu branu od Kanala.
I danas se poduhvat koji je preuzela egipatsdka armija smatra inzinjerskim cudom...
pored toga,primer tog rata se moze uzeti kao neoboriv dokaz,da se ratna doktrina koja se oslanja na avijaciju, vrlo ranjiva u slucaju kada protivnik ima solidne sisteme pvo. Inace ne mogu sada da nadjem,ali neko je napravio proracun,koliko je tada vredela avijacija izraela,a koliko pvo egipta, rezultat pokazuje otprilike da je egipat,sa 10tostruko manjim ulaganjem u ruske sisteme pvo, totalno neutralisao ogromnu moc izraelskog vazduhoplovstva,cija vrednost prevazilazi 10tostruku vrednost egipatske pvo.
E da se tako gleda uspjeh rata, ko je cije tehnike unistio i koliko sta kosta, valjda ti je (a vidim da nije) jasno da je vojska sredstvo politike i ciljeva zacrtanih, tehnika se zanovi ali gubitak teritorije i neuspjeh politike tesko da ima drugu sansu...
Dopuna: 18 Maj 2009 18:00
Three days into the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the situation changed completely, as a frontal clash with Syrian troops deployed in the Bekaa Valley and around Beirut became unavoidable. In order to establish air superiority over the battlefield, on the afternoon of 9 June 1982, starting at 14:14hrs, the IDF/AF executed the well known operation against the SAM-sites in the eastern Lebanon, deploying 26 F-4Es to attack Syrian radars with AGM-78 Standard ARM/Purple Fist and AGM-45 Shrike anti-radar missiles. A total of 19 radars was claimed as destroyed or neutralized in the first wave and one of the obvious consequences was, that in the following battles, caused by the appearance of the second Israeli wave, including a total of 92 A-4 Skyhawks, F-4E Phantoms, and Kfirs, escorted by F-15s and F-16s, both the Syrian SAM-stations and no less but 54 Syrian MiG-21 and MiG-23 interceptors sent to stop them were left „blind“. With their radars positioned inside Lebanon out, the Syrians were compelled to guide their fighters using long-range systems positioned inside Syria, and disturbed by the mountain ridges in between. These, however, were jammed by the Israelis, just like the communications between Syrian pilots and their GCI-stations, while - guided by Grumman E-2C Hawkeyes - Israeli interceptors waited in ambush at low level between Lebanese hills. In the ensuing battle, several Syrian MiG-21-squadrons were mauled. Syrian MiG-23MS-pilots played only a secondary role, and have claimed only one Israeli F-4E Phantom as shot down by R-3S’ missiles fired by two Floggers, while two of them were also shot down, with the loss of one pilot, Lt. Sofi. To contrary, Syrian MiG-23MF-pilots claimed a total of three kills, in exchange for three losses, with all pilots ejecting safely.
The following air-to-air battles fought over Lebanon between 9 and 11 June 1982 were some of the largest ever involving jet fighters, as subsequently the SyAAF started to fly air-to-ground missions as well. Initially a squadron-sized attack force, escorted by at least a squadron of interceptors, was dispatched, with the interceptor pilots being ordered to do their utmost to keep Israeli interceptors at bay. Col. K. H.*, a decorated MiG-23 pilot which flew 13 combat missions over Lebanon in June 1982, explained the situation:
"We were continuously pushed into pursuing the enemy by the ground control, although we were not in the best situations. The enemy used this to advantage and set up numerous ambushes were some fighters would drag us into the shooting zone of the others. When closed to 10-15 kilometers to the enemy, our radars would get black and we would lose all means of detecting them. Heavy jamming wasn’t concentrated on our radars alone, but also on our communications with ground control. Still, there were ways to trick that situation. One was for many formations to ingress simultaneously, or in waves one closely behind the other. This way the later waves would still have the ability to use their radar and fire at the enemy while they were busy engaging the first wave. This tactics, however, proved very expensive, and always lead to losses on our side.
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