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Iran, Saudi Arabia Draw Others into Their Struggle
Citat:The Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen designed to counter growing Iranian influence in the Arab world is drawing in Turkey and Pakistan. Neither of these non-Arab countries wants to be involved in the geopolitical and sectarian struggle between the Saudis and the Iranians. However, the nature of the Saudi-Iranian conflict means that the Turks, Pakistanis and others in the region are unlikely to escape its fallout.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a day trip to Tehran to meet with Iranian leaders on Tuesday — just 11 days after his unprecedented criticism of Tehran's involvement in the Yemeni conflict and the wider region. Hours before he was due in Tehran, he met with Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Naif, who paid an unexpected visit to the Turkish capital. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif is due to visit Islamabad soon to discuss the situation in Yemen with Pakistani leaders, just as the South Asian nation's parliament is considering how to respond to a Saudi request for major military assistance against the al-Houthi movement in Yemen. And last Friday, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was in Ankara on an unscheduled trip to discuss Yemen with Turkish leaders right after his defense minister and foreign affairs adviser returned from Riyadh with the Saudi request.
All of this activity largely involves non-Arab states in the greater Middle East that are heirs to historical regional powerhouses. About 500 years ago, the Ottomans and the Persian Safavid Empire were fighting over control of the northern rim of the Middle East — and by extension, the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula. At about the same time, the Safavids were locked in a struggle over Afghanistan with the Turkic-rooted Mughal Empire that ruled much of South Asia. Half a millennium later, Turkey and Iran are competing for influence in the largely Arab Middle East while Iran and Pakistan struggle for prominent roles in the future of Afghanistan.
The major difference between the medieval era and the present is the presence of a major Arab player in this geopolitical mix: Saudi Arabia. It is ironic that for much of the region's pre-modern history since the rise of Islam, the Arabs were not a power. What has been known as Saudi Arabia since 1932 was an obscure piece of geopolitical real estate, save for the Red Sea coastal region of Hejaz — largely because of the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina — and Yemen. Today, however, the actions of the Saudi kingdom, powered by petrodollars, are driving most of the region's historical Muslim powers.
The exception is Iran, whose expanding geopolitical footprint — coupled with the post-Arab Spring chaos in the region — has propelled the Saudis into assuming a leadership role. Since the 2002 rise of the post-Kemalist republic under Erdogan's Justice and Development Party, Turkey has sought to resume its role as a regional leader but has not been able to do much. To a great extent, this situation has been the result of Iran blocking Turkey in Iraq and Syria — a complete reversal of what occurred in the 1500s, when the Ottomans blocked the Safavids from expanding into the Arab world.
While the Turks have been trying to figure out how to counter Iranian/Shiite encirclement, the Saudis, by leading a coalition of military forces in Yemen, have demonstrated the kind of leadership the Turks seek over the region's Sunnis. In other words, the Turks are in reactive mode, which explains Erdogan's anti-Iranian outburst. Most observers see Turkey and Saudi Arabia as being on the same side, given that both are Sunni powers, but this shared sectarian identity actually makes the Turks and Saudis competitors.
After all, the Saudi dominion was founded as a rejection of Turkish rule over the Middle East. Riyadh and Ankara still have competing visions of what the Arab world should look like. Thus, while the Turks are concerned about Iran's growing influence — especially in light of the U.S.-Iranian rapprochement — they are not going to join forces with the Saudis against the Iranians. Instead, the Turks are simultaneously struggling to find a way to make sure the Saudis cannot use the situation in Yemen to further advance themselves, working out how to circumvent Iranian influence in Syria and Iraq.
The Turks are not the only ones unnerved by Riyadh's action in Yemen. The Pakistanis are being pressed heavily by their Saudi benefactors to send troops, warplanes and warships. The kingdom is calling in its favors from Islamabad, which has already been burned by the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the form of sectarian and jihadist violence. Pakistan is very close to Saudi Arabia, but it also knows that Iran is its neighbor and is on the path to international rehabilitation.
Islamabad has a great deal to gain from the U.S.-Iranian rapprochement, especially in terms of badly needed natural gas imports that have thus far been impossible because of the sanctions against Tehran. In addition, the Pakistanis know they have to settle with the Iranians on Afghanistan and that Tehran can exacerbate the sectarian proxy battleground that is Pakistan. During his visit to Islamabad, Zarif will be reminding his Pakistani hosts of the dangers of siding with the Saudis against the Iranians in Yemen.
This is why the pro-Saudi Sharif has not only called for a national debate on what action his government should take in regard to Yemen, but also he has been comparing notes with his Turkish counterparts on how to weather the worsening regional storm. Obviously the Turks are also trying to navigate between the Saudis and Iranians and cannot offer the Pakistanis much help beyond the idea that Ankara and Islamabad should mediate between the two sectarian rivals. But deep down they know that there is little they can do to avoid being affected by the conflict between the two rival Islamic states.
Članak sa Stratfor-a, od gazde.
Ima puno gubitnika u zbližavanju Irana i USA. Nema optimizma.
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