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- Pridružio: 02 Jun 2013
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Analiza o ukrajinskoj vojsci od strane:
Lt. Colonel Glen Gran, a defense and reform expert who has provided advisory services to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.
Ja sam najbitnije izvuko u citatima ceo tekst na linku.
Ako he bilo a promaklo bi brišite.
+ AnalizaCitat: Despite the maxim of “we trust in the ZSU” this organisation cannot be perfect having grown and changed so dramatically in such a short time. If it is possible to improve things then there should be no reason to continue with policies and practices that add extra risks of death to troops, damage morale and may even have longer term adverse political consequences.
Possibly the biggest problem for the ZSU leadership is developing a new army culture. A culture of every life matters. Every day the army is filling up with more people with no previous military background. They were civilians just weeks and months ago. Many are mature with strong business and professional backgrounds. They have limited tolerance of the top-down way of working common to the pre-24 February army. The “I am the chief you are a fool” attitude of some commanders still today, does not sit well with them. It is also not what society wants or expects. This expectation of change is especially so for those who have held leadership positions in business or have higher education. Of course these people must adapt their working culture and habits to the complex ways of the army, but at the same time the senior defence leadership must also understand that many of those they command will not act easily like an unthinking army of followers. Like the Finns in the winter war, they wish to be an “intelligent” force allowed to use their brains, different skills, self-motivation, and initiative and to be led intelligently not blindly ordered. They know when they see corruption, laziness, and stupidity. This cultural divide is proving problematic in many areas of the army and TrO as more and more casualties are taken, and people judge that many commanders are simply not good enough. And as casualties increase further the composition of the army will become more and more “civilian” and reflective of society than of the original army. Then the cultural issues and intolerance of poor commanders will increase.
Citat:GEOGRAPHICAL COMMAND BOUNDARIES
Fighting along geographical lines with clear operational boundaries and commanders is one of the least understood of NATO standards. In short, every unit from even the most basic infantry section upwards must have clear geographical boundaries. There must never be any chance of doubt about the left and right, back and front boundary of any fighting organisation. These must either be marked on a map or given verbally using distinct visible boundaries like roads or rivers. Every single piece of ground on the front line and behind must be owned by someone and they must be clear what their responsibilities for that ground are.
These boundaries denote the unit ownership of that specific area of battle space. The written (battalion and above) or verbal (below battalion) orders given to the commander should be clear for each area and the senior unit commander within each area is then king of that place. Anyone joining that area must be under command of that commander by order unless there are clear written orders from above saying otherwise and explaining exactly why. At present this does not always happen, and people die because of this lack of boundary clarity. Battalions can often find themselves with other organisations crossing their boundaries but with no prior communication about who, why and when. I spoke to one battalion staff member over Christmas who said that their battalion had fired on our own special forces twice and nearly fired on another unit. These units had entered the battalion territory without prior communication or liaison.
Blue on blue is the least of the problems. In Soledar battalions were added to the defence mix with limited geographical discipline or logic, and apparently with no discussion with the commanders of existing brigades. Without clear boundaries no commander can be sure of the geographical extent of their orders, the liaison requirements with neighbouring units and with the artillery. So, commanders cannot be sure of their units’ authority to fire or fly drones diagonally across boundaries, manoeuvre, advance or retire. Just adding new units to the battle without this clarity increases risk of failure.
Any lack of geographical clarity is not just dangerous but at every level the lack of knowledge about who commands an area and what resources are available clearly leads to sub optimal performance over the whole organisation. Whilst the best commanders realise the importance of this, many are too new and untrained to grasp the full significance of the dangers for battle of unclear boundaries and the importance of unity of command. Senior commanders must take this matter seriously and physically check that boundaries at all levels are clear to all. They must also ensure that there is a single commander in any area (usually the brigade commander) and that other non-army units like GUR, SOF, SSU, National Guard, Border Guard, Territorial or volunteer units, marines and the new drone units respect the rules and act always as one army organisation not following their own tasks and ambitions. The most recent battles show that there is an urgent requirement for new military policies and training of commanders about the geographic deployment rules, and command and control arrangements of troops in battle. Responsibilities for ground and commanders’ orders at all levels must be totally clear. Today they are often not and this causes unnecessary blood to be spilt.
The geographical boundaries must not be drawn too tightly around the unit. All units need room to manoeuvre so they can attack the enemy from the sides when they need and have room to change positions. Their battle space should also extend not only forwards into the enemy area but also to the rear. This is to be clear who owns the logistic areas and what space a unit has to manoeuvre and withdraw when needed.
A second challenge is that there should be no (NONE AT ALL) independent units on the battlefield below brigade size. If they must be in a particular area then they should be allocated to a brigade and under command of the brigade commander whoever they are. The brigade commander should be given clear orders of the extent of his authority with that unit. Where needed after any regrouping the geographical boundaries and orders of that brigade must be immediately changed to suit the new circumstances. This policy should apply to units of all types, arms, and services.
Citat:ONE ARMY CONCEPT
To add to the above the ZSU lacks a policy of “One army concept”. It may appear to be so de-jure but it is not de-facto. There are simply too many organisations working separately from each other and even at times in opposition. This creates pockets of “first, second and third “divisions of quality where some units are equipped and trained properly, and others are not. One serious problem today lies with TrO that is simply treated as second class in many respects, especially selection of commanders and unit training even though they de-facto form the national operational reserve. Brigades are today in the front line without being properly trained or resourced. This lack of a common concept encourages organisational arrogance where some parts of the military system are considered better or more important than others and are both treated and act so. This attitude risks sending soldiers and volunteers to their death early because the system has not valued them sufficiently to prepare them properly for the realities of battle. A future military one army policy should be that anyone in uniform must be commanded, trained, and equipped to the same basic quality as all others. A policy and law change is needed to ensure that TrO is not left playing a second-class game as it is now. It needs full and proper integration with the ZSU now. No matter how they started, today they are too vital and valuable for anything less.
Another problem concerns GUR and SOF that have unclear and conflating roles. GUR runs centralised intelligence, but this is separate from the army organisation it is there to support. There is no proper army J2 organisation so intelligence is simply often not given to those who need it in a form that can be used. Upwards intelligence from units is equally problematic. Additionally, SOF are supposed to be (and were trained by US to be) the deep attack organisation working behind the lines to disrupt and destroy. But in the absence of proper deep attack doctrine for SOF, this role has been taken by GUR. SOF are often being used as light infantry wasting years of expensive US training. Clear law, policies and doctrines are needed for decentralised army intelligence and deep attack, and to provide clarity of roles for both these organisations.
Citat:
COMMAND AND CONTROL- THE RULE OF FIVE
There is much academic evidence that for success no person should be expected to manage more than five complex subordinated organisations. In the western militaries this logic has not changed. In Israel they even consider three subordinate commands is sufficient. This policy stays despite the ideas from business of using flatter organisations and the introduction of electronic command systems. There are many reasons. One of these is the need for commanders to retain close human contact with those they command, not only one level, but two levels lower. This contact is vital for morale and passing command “strength of purpose”. This activity takes time. It is also vital for commanders to see people face to face to judge them, for leadership quality and ability, for tiredness and for their personal strength of purpose. Then they must recommend the best for further harder tasks or replace those not good enough. The second reason is to reduce information overload before decision making. Too many subordinate units means too much information. The third and arguably most important point is that the commander must “see the ground” before he judges how to fight the battle and what resources he needs to allocate to his subordinates. Too many units, too many commanders to judge, and too wide a geographic span of command provides too much information and simply overwhelms the thinking of senior people. Too many units to command also means poorly considered or rushed orders by stressed commanders. When there is quality time, the leaders two levels lower get to know what their Commander is thinking and wanting, and they learn to think two levels up (and the Commander two levels down) making chances of misunderstanding overall goals smaller. The junior commanders also learn from more discussion the logic from where the commanders original orders came, their thinking and the wider goals. The orders they receive are anchored in understanding allowing the subordinate commanders more chances of tactical innovation.
What this principle means is that in many areas like Bakhmut where there are many brigades there should be a single intermediate divisional level commander between the brigades and the regional headquarters with sole individual responsibility for success or failure. This principle of a senior commander on the ground commanding 3-5 brigades should logically be applied for all complex battle areas. The best commanders should be chosen for this. Thinking long term, perhaps these commanders should also be given international refresher training before they command. Officers like US Gen Ben Hodges would be happy to do this, but he is never asked. In the past these headquarters would have been divisional level. As the battlefield grows more complex there should be policy discussions about the need to reinstate them or at least some for key battle areas to gain greater command
Citat:COMMANDERS AND LEADERSHIP
There appear to be two levels of challenge about leadership and commanders that need policy discussion.
a. At the tactical level battalion and below there are both outstanding, and bad commanders, but no clear doctrinal policy guiding them how to operate in the field. NATO policy and historical lessons learned are that commanders should mostly operate forward with their troops and that the Chief of staff or XO should manage the command post and be the link between the commander and troops and the next higher HQ. If anyone doubts the arguments for this logic, they should watch the film Aliens. Its ideas are remarkably close to our current C2 capabilities and show clearly that commanders who lead from command posts can be overloaded with minor detail and are dangerously less capable of giving orders that reflect the reality on the ground.
It is unclear why some officers are chosen to command. The quality of Ukrainian commanders has regularly been praised and criticised equally on social media by those who are being led. The policy should be that those commanders who can get results with limited loss of troops must be promoted to more serious command roles – they are the most precious metal of the country. Those who are incapable of leading from the front and give unprofessional style orders that cause heavy casualties and do not reflect the ground truth should be quickly removed to other work. They are not the commanders Ukraine needs to win this war.
b. Key to battle management is the senior command ability to delegate to, listen to and take note of the concerns of junior commanders who are really doing the fighting. The NATO standard is that the commander actually physically involved in the battle (i.e., being shot at) is king. He may even be a sergeant or even a private soldier who has been forced to take command because of casualties. All other commanders senior to him of all ranks must be in support of them. They have to make the life-or-death decisions. Where humanly possible senior commanders must provide the intelligence, moral and physical resources for the battle commander to win. Senior commanders should not try to second guess the fight nor try to give orders that do not fit with how the battle commander sees the problem.
The battle commander under fire being king and not the most senior officer is a NATO standard and policy that some commanders are clearly finding it difficult to understand and implement. It goes against all their training and education. This needs direction and support from the highest levels as this is what the NATO instructors are expecting and teaching.
c. Commanders are responsible for training their troops at all levels and for the quality of that training. Commanders and staffs who do not have the knowledge and ability to conduct training of subordinates should not be commanders. Commanders who waste training time demanding unnecessary time-wasting reports should not be commanders. Training saves lives, reports do not.
d. At all levels of command trust is the key component. Fighting soldiers must trust their leaders and their orders if they are to fight to full effectiveness. This is vital. Trust is the most valued commodity for an army when you want people to fight and die for you. A present this trust is under strain. This is natural after 9 months of war and many deaths. Trust is gained and kept by two-way honesty and the leadership listening to front line needs and reality and acting upon it. Trust is reinforced by realistic and common-sense orders, by personal contact of leaders with those they command and by openly supporting them. Trust and openness is also vital with a society that is supporting the ZSU with critical needs.
The recently signed law 8271 is a serious challenge to the issue of trust. It goes against the natural course of justice in many ways. Whilst many think it is vital for control and discipline they should also recognise that creating a soviet type law to demand people do things that they may not be able do without dying, is also a rapid way to raise questions about their trust of Ukrainian society. This trust issue is especially important when units have not been resourced properly for the fight. It also raises questions about the very ethos and values that the government claims differentiate it from Russia. Trying to convince both society and soldiers that all is well when it is not, for example suggesting “wedding” drones are not needed by units is equally dangerous. The current policies and leadership activities suggest there are some poor communications and fractures between parts of the leadership and the front line that need serious political discussion and careful healing. This cannot be passed off as a Russian fake news problem. It is real.
Citat:COMMAND SELECTION
Selection of commanders is arguably the most important human factor in any war. Real commanders with leadership, intelligence, integrity, physical and moral courage, and luck are rare. All too often commanders have been selected by nepotism within military clans, by education or even by corruption but not by results and performance.
It should be the most important task for the commanders and staff at every level to identify those officers and potential officers who can get battle results with few casualties. There needs to be a policy now to set up a process through the command chain that identifies potential commanders for promotion and those who are not fit to command. These must be removed and replaced before they do more damage.
There are also NATO standards that staff appointments like Chief J7 (Training) are not commanders but staff. They should not make command decisions about training requirements. Commanders should only do one job. They should either be appointed to command operations (and nothing else) or to command the creation and training of units for operations. The reason they should not do both is that the requirements of each require 100% concentration 24/7/365 and exhausting leadership. There is not sufficient time for success in duplicate roles. Arguably the army commander must be full time training troops or full-time creating units but not both. Today he appears to do both roles. Somewhere there will be weakness and we do not see his best full time.
Citat:A LOGISTIC SYSTEM
The current logistic system (what system there is) is heavily centralised, sub optimal and piecemeal. In many areas of supply such as the supply of foreign equipment to units it has reached an amazing level of quality. In others like the supply of personal equipment to a soldier, medical supply, or vehicle maintenance, it still labours under soviet methods. The truth that logistics is broken in places can be judged by the fact that some units are seriously reliant upon NGOs and volunteers for large parts of their battle winning equipment and daily supplies. The current system is as far from NATO standard as it is possible to be. It needs steady reform based upon a set of coherent and “common to all requirements” principles and policies.The reality is that the policies for logistics need rethinking from first principles. The key area of supply should be simple and geographical, not as now supplies like food criss-crossing the country back and forth. Maintenance and repair must be close to the battle area not in Poland. Imagine that a brigade is a piece of equipment requiring electricity. When you move the equipment from room to room, you simply plug it into another electrical socket. Each area should have a socket of logistics and where needed an “extension lead” so that no brigade has to reach back further than one hours drive to get what it needs. The job of MOD is to produce the logistic power and the military logistics commander to ensure that power is always in the sockets near enough for all the devices. Where there are extreme distances then a logistic “socket” should be extended to bring supply closer to the unit. Every headquarters from brigade upwards should have a commander maintenance and physical support.The logistic power socket in this description should cover the basic elements of combat supply:
Medical supply and evacuation.
Unit combat supplies of food, fuel, ammunition, batteries, vehicle spares, and drones.
Personal equipment of all types (With registering on IT with no paper required)
Reach back ability for technical equipment for replacement and repair like phones, computers, and radios.
Forward maintenance of all soft skin and armoured vehicles up to engine and barrel changes and minor body repair.
Forward maintenance of technical equipment like weapon sights, drones, radios etc
The first policy to improve logistics should be to hire an experienced “defence systems engineer” to map out all the logistic processes and to seek and recommend efficiencies. Estonia has an experienced systems expert in Jaan Murumets who works for MOD. Ask for him as part of their support. The second policy should be to decide on the best method of commanding and delivering geographical supply down to brigades and battalions.
If a policy of designing mobile “close support” logistics for the future foreign equipment and mobile battle is not produced for each brigade, then there will be problems.
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