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Zacudices se slonic, ali neke americke analize navode da ih bas sklapaju u Jemenu, a to su zakljucili na osnovu karakteristicnih varova nadjenih na ostacima raketa, a koji su svi isti, i navodno podsjecaju na rucne varove dobrog majstora u nekoj garazi
Izguglaj Houthi arms manufacturing pa ces I Sam naci
Uostalom, evo citata. (Necu da postavljam link jer je vjerovatno na tracking)
Citat:Advanced Houthi Weaponry and Capabilities
Alongside tactical evolution influenced by Lebanese Hezbollah, the Ansar Allah movement has debuted a range of advanced weapons systems since 2015 with direct assistance from Iran. The clearest example of this is the Burkan 2-H medium-range ballistic missile, which the Houthis have used since May 2017 to strike Riyadh and Yanbu, around 600 miles distant from launch points in northern Yemen. In January 2018, the U.N. Panel of Experts on Yemen found conclusively that Iran produced the Burkan-2 missiles fired from Yemen, which were “a derived lighter version” of Iran’s Qiam-1 missileac designed specifically to achieve the range capable of striking Riyadh. Wreckage from 10 Burkan missiles suggests that they were smuggled into Yemen in pieces and welded back together by a single engineering team, whose fingerprint non-factory welding technique was found on all the missiles.75 Iranian components were also integrated into repurposed Yemeni SA-2 surface-to-air missiles to produce the Qaher series of surface-to-surface free-flight rockets, which were used to strike targets up to 155 miles inside Saudi Arabia on over 60 occasions between 2015 and 2017.76 Though Ansar Allah gained control over some capable Yemeni engineers from 2014 onward, the Houthis’ smooth absorption of new missile systems suggest that Iranian training and technical assistance supported the missile campaign. First, there was no apparent learning curve that would suggest experimental deployment of entirely new rockets and missiles.ad Second, Ansar Allah did not rely upon the Saleh-era Missile Batteries Group for missile operations and quickly developed an independent capacityae to launch missiles, with one Yemeni military informant present in Houthi-controlled Yemen in 2014-2017 noting, “[the Houthis] didn’t trust us. The missiles were moved from Sana’a to Sa’ada early on. [The Houthis] were quickly self-sufficient and didn’t need the Republican Guard or missile forces.”77
Other less advanced but nonetheless important new weapons systems have also been debuted in the Houthi arsenal since 2015.af One is Ansar Allah’s Qasef-1 unmanned aerial vehicle, which the United Nations stated was “virtually identical in design, dimensions and capability to that of the Ababil-T, manufactured by the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries.”78 Based on the design of the UAVs and the tracing of component parts, the panel concluded that the material necessary to assemble the Qasef-1s “emanated from the Islamic Republic of Iran.”79 An average of six Qasef-1 UAVs with explosive warheads have been launched each month since April 2017 by Ansar Allah, initially aimed at Gulf coalition Patriot missile batteries (to disrupt defenses ahead of surface-to-surface missile strikes) but increasingly against command centers (with unitary warheads at ranges up to 60 miles using GPS guidance) and even frontline troops (with bomb-releasing reusable UAVs under radio control).80
As with strategic missile systems, the Houthis took control of Yemen’s coastal missile batteries and then integrated them into an Iranian-supported salvage and modernization program. Since 2015, Ansar Allah has attacked shipping with naval mines and anti-ship missiles that were already in the Yemeni arsenal,ag to which it has added the use of boat-mounted ATGMs.81 The Houthis developed around 30 coast-watcher stations,ah “spy dhows,” drones, and the maritime radar of docked ships to create targeting solutions for attacks.82 Ansar Allah has also undertaken combat diver training on Zuqur and Bawardi islands in the Red Sea.i The most significant technological development undertaken by the Houthis in coastal defense was the conversion (with Iranian supportaj) of coast guard speedboats into the self-guiding Shark-33 explosive drone boat, which can be programmed to follow a course or home in on a target using electro-optical television guidance.ak This kind of device was used to successfully attack a Saudi frigate on January 30, 2017, (using television guidance) and unsuccessfully to attack a Saudi oil loading terminal on April 26, 2017 (using GPS guidance while maneuvering at 35-45 knots).83 The Shark 33 has been employed by the Houthis in a triangular formation, with the attack boat forward, a command boat nearby, and a media boat (to capture combat footage) further away.84 On one occasion, a Shark 33 was camouflaged by being loaded with fish.85
The accumulated balance of evidence strongly suggests that Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have developed powerful military and technical advisory missions in Yemen since 2014. According to Yemeni leaders present in Sana’a between 2014 and 2017, IRGC advisors were confined to Sana’a and to a missile construction site in Sa’ada. These advisors were “like a diamond to the Houthis” and were “kept in safe places to help give operational and strategic advice and guidance on tactics and procedures.”86 Lebanese Hezbollah operatives were more numerous and were not only kept in Sana’a and Sa’ada but also allowed forward as far as command posts and the Red Sea coastal defense sites.87 Hezbollah provided mentoring and training in infantry tactics, ATGM operations, offensive mine warfare, and anti-shipping attacks.88 A number of small-scale military industries have been established since 2014 to support the Houthi war effort and maximize domestic reuse and production capabilities, in order to minimize the effect of the international arms embargo on the Houthi movement. A land-mine production facility was established in Sa’ada, feeding around 20 tons of mines per day to distribution hubs in Sana’a, Hodeida, and Dhamar.89 A separate EFP fabrication facility was established in Sana’a.90 As mentioned earlier, a missile construction hub was transferred from Sana’a to Sa’ada. In Hodeida, a drone workshop operates, drawing on a supply of rolls of fiber-glass to make airframes.91
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