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Ovde su prethodna dva clanka
http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2018-11-30/1_1024_status.html
http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2018-11-22/12_1023_ship.html
The crisis state of the Naval Aviation of the Russian Navy
Citat:The newspaper "Independent Military Review" published another article by Maxim Klimov "The fiery sky of the Russian fleet. Without an effective and strong naval aviation, there can be no modern Navy" criticizing the development of the aviation component of the current Russian Navy.
One of the most serious comments made by the author on the previous two articles (“Russian Navy ran into mines and submarines”, “NVO” dated November 22, 188 and “Russian Navy deprived of ocean status”, “NVO” dated November 30, 188) and the importance of aviation in marine theaters, a factor that has become decisive for the appearance of all fleets since the Second World War. Earlier, the author has already touched on this issue in a number of publications, where various aspects of the use of fleet aviation, including history, were considered, and today the discussion will focus on the current state and development prospects.
SIZE
"In large-scale maneuvers involved 36 warships, submarines and support ships, about 20 aircraft, more than 150 weapons, military and special equipment of coastal missile-artillery and ground forces, marines and air defense forces", - stated in a press release Service of the Northern Fleet in June of this year. In fact, these figures are a recognition of the fact that the fleet defeats its own naval aviation and, accordingly, its incapacity against any strong enemy.
It is interesting to compare the statistics of "ships and airplanes" in previous exercises of the USSR Navy:
- exercises of the Northern Fleet "North 68" - about 300 warships and vessels (including 80 submarines) and about 500 aircraft;
- naval exercises of the USSR “Ocean” (1970) - only 80 submarines (including 15 nuclear ones), 84 surface ships and 45 auxiliary vessels operated in the far zone, aviation — 8 regiments (14 regiments), that is, at least 300-400 aircraft . In total, the aircraft conducted 5.5 thousand sorties, 752 refueling with the transfer of 4 thousand tons of fuel.
It is obvious that aviation in all tasks, except for the strategic nuclear destruction of enemy ground objects, was the main striking force of the fleet.
In 1982, the Northern Fleet had 395 warships and boats, 290 auxiliary ships and ... 380 aircraft, and 53 Ocean ships, 27 submarines, 18 auxiliary ships, as well as 14 naval aviation regiments and 3 fighter regiments Air defense, that is, more than 400 aircraft.
The numbers today are striking, but not by the number of ships and aircraft, but by their ratio. In the 1990s - early 2000s, the fleet actually strangled its own aircraft. Yes, times were hard. However, it was precisely in these difficult times that it was clearly manifested who was the “beloved daughter” (sub-melt) for the command of the Navy, and who was the “stepdaughter” (aviation).
WHERE IS OUR AIR TRAINER?
One of the priority issues concerns carrier-based aircraft. Many wonder how we managed not to lose our only aircraft carrier. I will express my opinion: it happened for two reasons. The first is the responsible position of a number of Navy officials, who understood that there are mistakes worse than a crime, and who did everything in their power to preserve the hardship of carrier-based aircraft with such difficulty. The second is PR of the Navy and the defense-industrial complex (DIC) on a carrier-related subject (including with the aim of providing additional funding).
About "our future aircraft carriers" was not just said a lot, models of "our" Nimitz "were seen in the offices of the first persons of the Ministry of Defense. Only the realities and facts are such that even with the availability of funds, we simply have nowhere to build such a ship: no domestic shipyard is able to ensure its normal construction.
But the most important thing is actually the inefficient state of the only aircraft carrier currently in service. What prevented the Navy in the "fat financial years", immediately after the delivery of the aircraft carrier Vikramaditya to the Indian customer, to carry out a full-fledged repair and modernization of the Kuznetsov?
We have invested heavily in the repair and "modernization" of the heavy nuclear missile cruiser (TARKR) "Admiral Nakhimov", but at the same time retained its previous concept of the "missile cruiser". What is the result? Our “missile Yamato” in terms of impact potential (80 attack missiles) turns out to be worse than a pair of modernized Spruences (old American destroyers with almost 70 missiles, including cruise and anti-ship, each with a displacement of more than three times smaller).
When talking about the cost and feasibility of such a modernization of Nakhimov, today even those who were its active supporters several years ago are clutching their heads. And if the money spent on “Admiral Nakhimov” went to re-equip it into a “small aircraft carrier”, this would have been a completely different effect - both for politics (demonstration of the flag and “projection of force”) and for the military power of the state. Moreover, the effect is systemic, with a sharp and adequate increase in the role of aviation in the composition of the Navy. There would be a real justification for the destroyer “Leader” with a nuclear power plant, since the capabilities of the aircraft equipment and aircraft carrier are crucial for operational connection ships.
However, everything that the Navy has been doing in the last 10 years on aircraft carrier topics (and related issues) can be characterized by the short but precise word "manilov." Nevertheless, there are chances - during the Syrian company, the Supreme Commander put the question firmly: “Where is our aircraft carrier?”, Pulling our naval commanders to war. Practice shows that if the Supreme question is tough, then in the future it really begins to be solved. And in relation to the deck aircraft it took place.
HELICOPTERS THAT NO
A very ambiguous reaction in the Navy, the defense industry and society was caused by an attempt to purchase French amphibious assault ship-docks (DVKD) "Mistral". Of course, this was not only a political decision, but, from the standpoint of today, very literate and reasonable. Taking into account the primacy of the policy on military issues, the fleet could subsequently receive either an effective power tool, or a “suitcase without a handle”. Alas, practice has shown that everything went to the last version.
At the same time, it should be especially noted that, against the background of the mass of fair from the technical and other points of view, critics of this project have lost the main thing: where is our full-fledged transport and landing sea helicopter ?! For the fact that they got out of the "scrap" for the "Mistral" - Ka-29, has a lot of restrictions for solving amphibious tasks. The only thing that pleases is the creation of the Ka-52 naval modification, but, moreover, it is obvious: its priority in the absence of new and effective landing helicopters is much lower.
Given the cuts in funding, the question arises: what kind of DVKD our fleet will receive in the future? Plans for 15-thousand and 30-thousand-ton ships (DVKD and universal landing ship) were announced. But maybe we start all the same with the more simple and necessary? For example, "small DVKD" type of Singapore "Endurance"? Its closest counterpart, the large landing ship (BDK) of the Ivan Gren type, has too many flaws, but this is our only new project with group-based helicopters.
At the same time, I’ll emphasize: there are no new helicopters for new landing craft. Plans for the promising helicopter “Lampa” are obviously unrealistic, and not only because the practice and timing of the creation of domestic marine helicopters shows this, but primarily because the Lampah is focused on the new engine and is “pilot” to introduce it into our helicopters. The question arises: how realistic is it to drag such a difficult task of our naval aviation? As a result, the only real way out today seems to be the creation of a multi-purpose helicopter based on the Ka-32 with its deep modernization.
But do we even have multipurpose ship-based helicopters? Ka-27 is not such even in the newest version (Ka-27M). What prevented the implementation of this modernization to provide for the use of strike weapons, EW tools, effective transportation of goods? One cannot speak of the possibility of targeting shipboard anti-aircraft guided missiles at low-flying targets, given that even in its main purpose, anti-submarine, the Ka-27M seriously loses to all Western modern helicopters.
The reason is the outdated concept of building a search and sighting system (APS) and the preservation of the old high-frequency antenna of a lowered sonar station (OGAS). Accordingly, it is impossible to “highlight” the field of buoys for the detection of modern low-noise submarines and the joint work in the form of a single multi-position system with hydroacoustic stations (GAS) of ships, which has been a classic anti-submarine warfare campaign in the West for a couple of decades.
FLYING ANTIQUES
Extreme obsolescence of the PPS (even the "newest", such as the "Novella" and "Killer Whale") is the main drawback of our anti-submarine aviation. At the same time, we still consider radio-acoustic buoys (RGAB) as separate (single) hydroacoustic stations. Our “buoy field” is a set of single receivers, while in the West, starting from the 1980s, the transition to joint integrated processing of signals from the RGAB field began as a single antenna, that is, the RGAB became a “sensor”. This technical solution dramatically increased the search performance of anti-submarine aircraft. With the appearance in the early 1990s of low-frequency RGAB emitters (LFA), the detection of the lowest noise submarines was ensured.
In addition, today the fleet has remained practically without reconnaissance aircraft, in most cases its functions are performed by extremely expensive anti-submarine aircraft, which are few. And the problem here is not only in the cost of such intelligence, but also in its periodicity: rare spans of reconnaissance aircraft, about which the “partners”, as a rule, know in advance, are unlikely to be an effective means of intelligence.
Are there any solutions here? Of course!
A number of Russian organizations have long conducted research and testing of new information processing technologies for the RGAB, including the use of full-service RGAB naval aviation. The goal is a sharp increase in the ability to detect low-noise targets. The only question is in the implementation of these works in modern aircraft teaching staff. In addition, the technical solutions implemented in these developments (in many respects similar to those in the West) provide the possibility of effectively integrating the RGAB information in technical information processing tools that have a cost much lower than today's PPPs. These solutions open up the possibility of creating mass patrol aircraft. Drones, whose use from ships began in the US Navy as early as the 1960s (anti-submarine QH-50 DASH), could help in reconnaissance, and today, unmanned aircraft is solving an ever wider range of tasks. But what the Russian Navy has today is simply zero, and, in an amicable way, this topic requires a separate article for consideration.
Air defense umbrella
Regardless of the effectiveness of the new ground-based air defense missile systems, the air defense system built only on their basis is already vicious due to geographical factors (the curvature of the Earth and the presence of radio horizon). We need fighters, we need airborne early warning and control aircraft (AEWS).
Today, ground-based naval aviation is making a transition to the Su-30SM fighter, which is undoubtedly a positive factor in enhancing the air defense capabilities of the fleet. In this case, there are serious questions about the flight of naval aviation, the presence in the ammunition of new missiles and EW facilities (due to the traditional "pinching" of naval aviation on financing).
At the same time, the modernized A-50U aircraft in the Russian Armed Forces are extremely small, and the fleet cannot be counted on them objectively. In this situation, an extremely urgent task is the creation of a tactical, mass Aerofarm aircraft. This aircraft is extremely important both for the Navy and for all the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. At the same time, in order to increase its security and overall effectiveness of air defense, it is necessary to raise the question of the possibility of targeting ground-based and shipborne anti-aircraft guided missiles to targets by aviation means.
SAVERS THAT NO
The enormous size of our country sharply raises the question of search and rescue support using aircraft. Moreover, such means in large quantities are available in foreign countries, but we have practically none (only a few Ka-27PS). I will give just one example: the death of the middle reconnaissance ship "Estuary" at the Bosporus. The presence in the Black Sea Fleet of airborne rescue vehicles, the landing of rescuers and these facilities (such as inflatable pontoons and patches) could have prevented the death of a ship in those conditions.
Even more important is the availability of such funds in the North and in the Pacific Ocean. In the 90s, the question was put on the completion of the project 908 ekranoplan as an ocean rescuer (perhaps the only adequate use of them), but today it is forgotten, but again we are getting involved in a scam with ekranoplans.
AVIATION PROBLEMS - NOT TECHNICAL
It should be noted here that the problems of our naval aviation are not really technical, but organizational. Let's start with the fact that the research organization of naval aviation is not included in the structure of the Navy, but in the videoconferencing system (and the relationship between “ship” and “aviation” organizations is an extremely painful question), and ending with questions of commonplace financing.
The obvious priority of the Navy is the submarines (in respect of which there are many questions about various problems and the effectiveness of spending money). A much lower priority is surface ships, and aviation is simply in the role of stepdaughter.
In the film of the TV channel “Star” “Animal Division”, a maneuver of “evading” our multipurpose submarine from the “enemy's plane” is shown. Alas, both the maneuver, tactics, and military means in support of this, our submarine became outdated by 20 years. At one time the phrase “cat stuck in felt boots” was used on the multipurpose submarines of the Pacific Fleet, about which strategic missile carriers of the 667BDR project could apply one more expression: “I see nothing, hear nothing”, but at the same time, it was allegedly provided with secrecy (the missile carriers had high noise and long-obsolete underwater acoustics). Today, in the role of a “cat in a felt boot,” our entire sub-base acts against the enemy aircraft. At the same time, without any effective air support, there can be no talk of any actions at a considerable distance from the coast of our submarines.
Of course, today we have an abnormal imbalance of expenses, so it is necessary to take decisive measures to redistribute the Navy from submarines (with unconditional opening and elimination of their problems) to naval aviation.
Repair and modernization of the Kuznetsov TAVKR should be carried out not only in the form of replacement of boilers and aerofinisers, but through comprehensive modernization of the ship, aircraft group and escort ships to work as part of a single operational connection.
It is highly advisable to create a training operational connection in the Black Sea Fleet with a training aircraft carrier, created as soon as possible on the basis of a large civilian vessel. We need experience in the use of carrier-based aircraft and interaction with ships. "Kuznetsov" in the repair, and the cost of its operation is very high. Therefore, we really need to have a “ship's desk” (training aircraft carrier) to handle deck aircraft.
It is appropriate to recall the American experience. Given the harsh clashes of different opinions on the subject of new means of struggle at sea, extraordinary decisions were taken by Congress and the command of the US Armed Forces. In 1925, the commander of the new squadron of naval aviation, Captain J. Reeves, received the broadest authority for conducting real sea tests and implementing their results. By basic education, he was an artillery officer and by that time managed to command a cruiser and three battleships. While studying at the Naval College (similar to our Naval Academy), Reeves became a naval aviation enthusiast, at 52 he trained as a flight observer and in August 1925 headed the aviation of the US Navy linear forces. Then the first ship commanded by Reeves, the old coal miner Jupiter, converted into a training aircraft carrier Langley, became the "School desk".
The results of these extensive experiments and tests formed the basis for the subsequent development of the US Navy and became the foundation of their victory in the Pacific.
In general, it seems that the following conclusions can be drawn:
- it is necessary to revise the priorities of financing components of the Navy with a significant increase in the share of naval aviation (at the expense of submarines);
- it is necessary to “aviationize” the organization of the Navy as a whole, and the NRO of the naval aviation (branch of the 30th scientific research institute) must obey the structures of the Navy;
- repair and modernization of TAVKR "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" should be carried out in the form of a comprehensive program to create a modern operational connection of the Navy with the corresponding modernization of naval aviation and escort ships;
- for the accumulation of experience and research exercises, it is necessary to create a training aircraft carrier and to form a training operational unit (optimally on the Black Sea Fleet);
- it is necessary to recreate the strike force of naval aviation, at least as part of a regiment of modernized Tu-22M3 (with new means of detection, destruction and EW);
- it is necessary to significantly increase the number of DRLOU helicopters as part of the Navy (with giving them the possibility of targeting anti-aircraft guided missiles of ships) and the creation of a massive DRLOi tactical aircraft;
- Modernization of anti-submarine aviation of the Navy with the introduction of modern submarine search technologies, as well as the creation of a new mass patrol reconnaissance aircraft;
- on the basis of the Ka-32 helicopter, it is necessary to create a multi-purpose helicopter for ships of the Navy, as well as the creation of its amphibious modification for promising landing ships.
Questions of unmanned aircraft for the fleet should be considered separately.
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