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- CheefCoach
- Legendarni građanin
- Pridružio: 14 Avg 2011
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Napisano: 23 Nov 2017 16:47
Minimi je timski puskomitraljez, a ne odeljnski. Pod time mislim da vojske koje duze Minimi imaju odeljenje od 2-3 tima od 4 coveka, a u svakom od tih timova ima jedan Minimi. Znaci za VS, 2 komada po odeljenju.
Dopuna: 23 Nov 2017 17:05
Kada smo vec kod minimija, nasao sam zanimljivu kritiku o njemu. Autor teksta ga smatra neprakticnim i nepouzdanim.
https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/m249-light-machinegun-automatic-rifle-role
+ Clanak o upotrebi minimija kod Americkih MarinacaCitat:The M249 Light Machinegun In The Automatic Rifle Role
By Ray Grundy - Originally Published April 2001
"Nine Marines died in action today, six of them in the rice paddies just in front of the enemy fortifications. They were found with their MI 6 rifles broken down in an attempt to remove cartridges jammed in the chambers. They had powder-burned bullet holes in their heads. "
-Commanding Officer, Company H, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. Operation SwIFT, 4-15 September 1967, Vietnam.
Does the M249 squad automatic rifle (SAW) have the potential to produce a similar tragic ending? The circumstances that produced this incident can be attributed to a testing and fielding process that was tragically flawed. What will it take to bring to the attention of our senior leadership the fact that the M249 SAW has major problems when it is designated to fill the role of an automatic rifle (AR)? Will history repeat itself? I believe, as do many of my fellow weapons officers, that the M249, while having potential as a general purpose light machinegun (LMG), falls way too short as an individual combat rifle. I will attempt in the following paragraphs to bring into focus those characteristics that make the M249 a liability on the battlefield.
The M249 SAW is past its projected service life. M249s in our infantry battalions are functioning at an unsatisfactory level of performance in terms of mean rounds between stoppages. There is an approved $4 million reprocurement for the Fiscal Year 2001 Program Objective Memorandum, in addition to the SAW enhancement program under-way to refurbish current inventories. Based on factual illustrations in the following paragraphs, and its well-known, dismal field performance, I urge the Marine Corps to conduct a thorough review to determine if further procurements of additional weapons of this model are prudent based on a history of poor performance. An evaluation of the M249 against a suitable true AR would be in the best interest of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF).
The M249's weight (22 lbs with a 200-round drum of ammo attached), which enables it to be carried as an AR by one Marine, was attained by manufacturing the M249 in a manner that correlates to a tradeoff in durability when compared to crewserved weapons like the M240G machinegun or the M2 heavy barrel machinegun. Fielded in 1984, the M249 was heralded as an AR that would deliver a notable increase in firepower for the infantry squad. However, within 5 years a product improvement program (PIP) was initiated to improve weapon performance. The PIP consisted of adding a hydraulic buffer to the buttstock to reduce the vibration of the gun in attempts to increase gunner accuracy, the placement of a heat shield over the barrel and, the most significant addition, introduction of a second barrel to the component. This early PIP suggests that perhaps the M249 was not evaluated thoroughly as an individual combat rifle.
The M16A2 succeeded the M16A1 as the standard combat rifle for the Marine Corps. Unlike the M16A1, which could fire both semiautomatic and automatic fire, the improved M16A2 limited riflemen to semiautomatic and burst fire only. The adoption of the M16A2 meant the squad no longer had an automatic rifleman. With the nucleus of the fire team fading into the history books, the Marine Corps rushed to embrace the M249 as the new AR. I will illustrate in the following paragraphs why I believe the selection was wrong.
Ammunition
Let's examine the problems associated with having weapons in the fire team that fire a different DoDIC (Department of Defense identification code) of ammunition. What we find is that the M249 fires M855 (A064) ball-linked ammunition, and the M16A2 uses standard M855 (A059) ball. This difference in ammunition can contribute to unnecessary friction on the battlefield and in the rifle squad. Without commonality of ammunition between members of the fire team, the exchange of ammo between the automatic rifleman and riflemen is difficult at best. For example, if a rifleman runs out of ammunition, he may have to resort to delinking SAW ammo. This is a labor intensive process. Inversely, if the SAW gunner depletes his ammo supply, he will be forced to use rifle magazines. The failure of M16 magazines to perform properly in the M249 is a major flaw in the system. To quote Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-15.1, Machine Guns and Machine Guns Gunnery:
As an emergency means of feeding, the SAW can use a 20 or 30 round magazine, but this will increase the chance of stoppages.
Is this an acceptable performance criterion for a first line combat rifle, the rifle designated as the backbone of the fire team? I think not.
Dealing with two different types of ammunition during resupply on a chaotic battlefield creates additional problems for distributor as well as user. Since both DoDICs are packaged in identical containers, identification, while easy during the day, creates chaos at night. As an example, imagine yourself as a rifle squad leader. Your squad started the attack with eight Marines but, due to casualties, you're now down to five. You've been pushing the enemy all day. Nightfall is closing, your unit is ordered to halt its advance and dig in. You expect a counterattack. Because of casualities you now have one M249 remaining. Two things you desperately need-ammo and water. Confusion surrounds you. Ammunition is being pushed forward quickly as supplies are critically short. As darkness falls a Marine rushes to your fighting hole and pushes in an ammo can that he believes is ball ammo. Murphy's Lawyou need 5.56 ball ammo, well you're sure to get linked.
Until the Marine Corps adopts an AR that fires the same ammunition as our service rifle, we can expect this unnecessary chaos. One way to prevent this disaster is by embossing the word SAW on the top of SAW ammo cans for easier identification at night. But commonality of ammunition for the rifle squad is a key element to reducing this type of friction on the battlefield.
Another benefit of adopting a true AR is that you will save enormous amounts of money in ammunition costs that can be directed at other initiatives. Today the Marine Corps purchases 5.56mm four and one linked (A064), 5.56mm ball-linked, no tracer (AO62), and 5.56mm blank (A075) for the M249. Replacing the SAW with an AR will eliminate three DoDICs of ammunition reducing costs and at the same time greatly enhancing automatic rifleman performance. Examine the graph in Figure 1. This graph shows the overall improved margin of performance attained by Marines engaging targets with the Colt AR ofter only a 5-minute period of instruction on the weapon.
The Marine Corps can learn from the Soviet Army decision in the early 1980s to remove their 7.62mm RPD belt-fed LMG from the rifle squad (see Figure 2) and replace it with, guess what-the Soviet 7.62mm RPK AR. The RPK is a modified AK rifle with a longer, heavier barrel, a muzzle-mounted bipod, a slightly altered buttstock to facilitate automatic fire from the prone position, and a larger capacity box magazine. The Soviets realized the problems with a belt-fed gun in the infantry squad and reduced them immensely by returning to the basic AR concept. If it is not clear to you as to why they would do this, you might ask any infantry combat veteran. His response will surely be, "too much weight and too much hassle with linked ammunition. That's why." The Soviets came to this realization and took appropriate action. I'm afraid it will take a needless loss of life on several occasions to illustrate this problem and bring to our attention that an LMG serving as an AR is not practical.
Spare Barrel
What determined the spare barrel requirement for the M249? If you do some research you will discover that the initial issue M249s were fielded with a single barrel. So why did the Marine Corps add a spare barrel? The original SAW barrels were configured with a gas regulator with two gas port selection ability. In theory, when carbon buildup in the gas port slowed the cycle of functioning, the gunner could rotate the gas regulator to a higher setting and retain proper operation. Normal setting is 700 rpm (rounds per minute); adverse is 1,000 rpm. Unfortunately, Marines were not trained correctly, and as a result many fired using the adverse gas setting resulting in the destruction of many barrels. Instead of seeing this as an operator training issue, we viewed it as a requirement for an additional barrel.
Rates of Fire
Understanding the rates of fire for the SAW will confirm that a spare barrel is unnecessary when the SAW is used as an AR. The sustained rate of fire is 85 rpm with no barrel change. Rapid fire is 200 rpm with a barrel change after 2 minutes. Show me the Marine who can move while shooting greater than 85 rpm using 3- to 5round bursts, and I'll show you a Marine who is not engaging targets properly and wasting valuable ammunition. The bottom line-the Marine Corps added a second barrel to the table of equipment that is not warranted.
Let's examine this spare barrel concept more closely. When does the automatic rifleman change barrels? In the attack? It is absurd to think this is feasible. Change barrels in the defense? While firing the final protective fires perhaps? Another problem associated with a spare barrel is that the operator cannot zero the barrel for windage. Zero data is obtained for the primary barrel by manipulation of the rear sights. No two barrels are milled precisely the same as to produce the same trajectory. As a result, to adjust the spare barrel for elevation, manipulate the front sight post using the spanner wrench. You cannot adjust for windage. If you are shooting out .5 mils at 36 yards, you'll be off the target 6 inches at 300 yards. U.S. Army Field Manual 23-14, M249 Light Machine Gun in the Automatic Rifle Role states, "When employed as a machine gun, it has a tripod with a T&E [traverse and elevation] mechanism and a spare barrel." This problem is further compounded with the semifixed front sight housing on each barrel. The photograph in Figure 3 has two barrels side by side. Note that barrel "A" on the left has the sight housing centered over the rifle barrel while barrel "B" on the right is of[center. This offcenter sight housing of barrel B caused a significant deviation in the strike of the round as illustrated in Figure 4. The bullet holes labeled A were impacts on target number one from the centered barrel A. The impacts on target number one labeled as B were produced by the off centered barrel B. The shooter's aiming point was target number two.
The Marine Corps must review the policy of a spare barrel for the M249. If the decision is made to continue to use the spare barrel, then an LTI (limited technical inspection) of each barrel must be performed to ensure that the front sight barrel housings are properly centered. A spare barrel is an unnecessary burden to an already overloaded Marine. A spare barrel is not required for the M249 when used in the automatic rifleman role.
I am convinced that the proponents supporting the M249 are totally fixed on the 200-round belt-fed magazine capacity for the weapon. I believe that this single attribute alone prevents them from seeing the many detractors this weapon has when used in the AR role. It is not the quantity of ammunition we carry, it is the ability to be effective with the quantity of ammunition we carry. To quote in part, My Rifle, The Creed of a United States Marine, by MajGen W.H. Rupertus, USMC(Ret):
My rifle and myself know that what counts in this war is not the rounds we fire, the noise of our burst, nor the smoke we make. We know it is the hits that count. We will hit.
A recent field test conducted at Marine Corps Combat Training Center between the M249 SAW and the Colt AR showed that automatic riflemen were more effective with the Colt AR, hitting more targets than with the M249 and doing so with less ammunition. The evaluation was conducted using skilled M249 SAW gunners on a 36-meter battle sight zero qualification target and on Range 103, an automated range. During the automated range evaluation, Marines were able to reload and reengage the popup targets faster and more effectively with the Colt AR than with the SAW. On average, Marines only missed one or two popup targets during reloading of the Colt AR. SAW gunners missed as many as five target engagements during reloading. Every Marine participating in this event preferred the Colt AR to the M249 SAW. Shouldn't we be listening to these Marines? The table in Figure 5 speaks for itself.
We all must accept the fact that the SAW is an extremely difficult rifle to master. It is simply not a weapon that one can easily pick up and be effective with. Becoming a skilled automatic rifleman with the SAW is a lengthy training process. You can expect to turn over automatic riflemen due to casualties. Would it not be sensible to adopt an AR with common characteristics to other weapons within the fire team? The Marine Corps is noted for being innovative and thinking out of the box. It appears, however, that when it comes to the SAW, we are willing to accept the status quo ante.
My evaluation of the M249 SAW is based on firsthand field observation. How many times have I seen automatic riflemen in the attack confronted with a malfunction on the SAW causing them to take immediate action to clear the stoppage? The nightmare begins with the raising of the feed tray cover to identify and fix the problem. Oftentimes what happens is the ammunition belt will slide off the feed tray and fall back inside the ammunition drum. The Marine is now in a desperate situation. Not only does he have a weapon malfunction to clear, his problem is compounded because he is now faced with the challenge of what to do with the ammo inside the drum. Does he remove the ammo box from the weapon, hold it upside down, and attempt to shake the ammo belt out, or does he reach around for a new drum? All this time he remains out of action. His weapon is down; he is not engaging the enemy; he is unable to defend himself. His fire team is advancing and the fire coverage he is supposed to provide is lost. The Marine Corps should arm the SAW gunner, as we do the machinegunner, with an M9 9mm pistol so that if presented with a similar situation he can at least defend himself.
I fail to see the logic in the continued support for the M249 system. As a general purpose LMG it has merit. However, when used in the AR role, it is a liability to the squad. The weapon remains too heavy. It negates commonality of ammunition in the fire team, will not operate very well with magazines, can only be fired accurately from the supported position, and is often carried in condition three (rounds on the feed tray, bolt forward on an empty chamber, weapon on fire) during movement to contact because we are not confident in the system. These problems are compounded by the fact it remains a very difficult weapon to master. Imagine the advantages of having weapons in the rifle squad with identical characteristics, using the same ammunition. Imagine the benefits of weapon standardizationM4, M16A2, and Colt AR. Every Marine, male and female, is introduced to the Colt Ml 6A2 in boot camp. Being assigned a Colt AR, with its similar design to the M16A2 makes for ease in the transition from rifleman to automatic rifleman.
Another issue to consider is optics. The Marine Corps is moving to rifle optics for its service rifle and SAW. One will be the rifle combat optic for the M16A2 and the other is a machinegun optic for the SAW. With the retention of the SAW the Marine Corps must purchase two different types of optics for the fire team. Field the Colt AR, and you have one optic at the fire team-one optic to purchase, train to, account for, and repair.
Recently, I was asked to brief the infantry operational advisory group (IOAG), composed of regimental commanders from both the Active and Reserve divisions, on whether an LMG (M249) should fill the role of the AR within the rifle squad or are Marines better served by having an AR perform that function? The recommended course of action from the IOAG to the Commandant of the Marine Corps was for the Marine Corps to adopt an AR to replace the aging M249 SAW. Clearly, the most practical and best choice is the Colt AR. If our proficiency with the SAW is marginal in the ground combat element, what is it in the other elements of the MAGTF where Marines do not routinely train with the weapon? You can argue that we need more ammunition to improve training. You can illuminate the spare barrel, but at the end of the day it is still an LMG in the AR role and, in this role, it is the Achilles heel of the rifle squad.
The dye is cast. The approval for new M249s to replace those weapons in our infantry battalions that are past service life is a reality. Have we lost our chance to turn back? I recommend the Marine Corps halt further purchases of new M249s. Why would you want to continue with a system that has proven, over the course of 18 years, that it does not meet the requirements of the automatic rifleman? I'm convinced that the Marine Corps must evaluate the M249 SAW against a suitable Ak like the Soviet Army did. Do we really want an LMG filling the role of an AR? Armchair quarterbacks say I'm too harsh on the SAW. Our proficiency tells us otherwise. Let no man's ghost tell us that if only we took the action necessary to replace the M249 SAW, we could have been more effective and saved lives. The M249 remains a liability to the rifle squad.
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